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Abstract 
We consider a Stackelberg mixed market in which a state-owned welfare-maximizing (domestic) public 
firm competes against a profit-maximizing (foreign) private firm. We suppose that the domestic firm is 
less efficient than the foreign private firm. However, the domestic firm can lower its marginal costs by 
conducting cost-reducing R&D investment. We examine the impacts of privatization on decisions upon 
cost-reducing R&D investment by the domestic firm and how these affect the domestic welfare. We show 
that privatization lowers productive efficiency of the domestic firm, regardless of whether the domestic 
firm is leader or follower. Furthermore, we also show that privatization of the domestic public firm 
deteriorates the domestic social welfare, regardless of whether the domestic firm is leader or follower. 
Keywords 
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1. Introduction
Competition between public and private firms exists in a range of industries like telecommunications, electricity, 
natural gas, airlines industries, as well as services including hospitals, banking and education. Some authors studied 
mixed oligopolies under Cournot competition (firms move simultaneously) and some others considered Stackelberg 
models (firms move sequentially). Pal (1998) studied a Stackelberg mixed duopoly with homogenous goods, and 
Matsumura (2003) studied a Stackelberg mixed duopoly where a public firm competes with a foreign private firm. 
Many studies about international mixed markets assume that all the firms have identical technologies (see, for 
instance, Fjell and Heywood (2002) Nishimori and Ogawa (2002), using a mixed oligopoly model, investigate the 
effects of deregulation on the cost-reducing incentives of a public firm. Lin and Ogawa (2005) show that while a 
private firm carries out the cost-reducing investment, a public firm does not have an incentive to reduce its costs as 
long as the market share of the private firm is sufficiently large. 
There are many other papers on the field of international mixed models (see, for example, Ferreira and Ferreira 
(2013, 2014) and Fjell and Pal (1996) among others). Tomaru (2007) analyzed, in a Cournot model, how decision-
making upon cost-reducing R&D investment by a domestic public firm is affected by privatization when competing 
in the domestic market with a foreign private firm. He shows that privatization of the domestic public firm lowers 
productive efficiency and deteriorates domestic social welfare. In this paper, we examine the same question but in a 
Stackelberg formulation instead of Cournot. We show that the results are qualitatively similar, if the firms take their 
decisions either simultaneously or sequentially. 
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2. Description of the model 
 
We consider a mixed duopoly market with one domestic firm and one foreign firm. The foreign firm is a profit-
maximizing firm (i.e. a private firm), and the domestic firm is social-welfare-maximizing firm (i.e. a public firm). 
The two firms are assumed to sell homogeneous products. 
The inverse demand function for the product in the domestic market is given by  1 d fP q q   , where P is the 
price, dq  is the output of the domestic firm and fq  is the output of the foreign firm. Both firms have constant 
marginal cost technologies ic , with ,i d f . For simplicity, we assume that  0,1/ 3dc c   and 0fc  , so that 
the domestic public firm is less efficient than the foreign private firm. We consider that the domestic firm can lower 
its marginal production cost by conducting cost-reduction R&D investment. We denote by t the amount of that 
reduction. The marginal production cost of the firm declines with the R&D investment. The effective marginal 
production cost will, then, be given by c t . As in (2007), we assume a cost function TC for R&D investment given 
by   2) / 2TC t kt , with 0k  . 
The profit of the foreign private firm is defined by 
 1f d f fq q q     
while the domestic firm's profit is given by 
   2
1
1
2
d d f dq q c t q kt       . 
Domestic social welfare W is the summation of the consumer surplus and the domestic firm's profit, that is, 
 
21
2
d f dW q q    . 
The model is a three-stage game. In the first stage, the domestic public firm chooses the amount t of cost-reducing. 
Then, the firms compete à la Stackelberg. We will consider two cases: 
 Case I - The domestic firm is the leader; 
 Case II - The foreign firm is the leader. 
We solve the games by backward induction. Finally, we assume that 4 / 3k  , which makes optimization problems 
in the first stage sensible. 
 
3. Case I - The domestic firm is the leader 
 
First, in this section, we examine the game where the domestic firm is the leader. In the competition of quantity 
levels, the domestic firm chooses its output volume dq , and the foreign firm chooses fq  after having observed the 
quantity level dq . 
 
3.1 Mixed duopoly 
 
Here, we suppose that the domestic firm is a public firm. Given the domestic public firm's level t of cost-reduction 
and the output level dq , the foreign firm maximizes its own profit f , which yields 
1
2
d
f
q
q

 . 
The domestic public firm chooses the output level dq  that maximizes the social welfare W, which gives 
 
3 4 4
3
d
c t
q t
 
 . 
So, 
 
 2
3
f
c t
q t

 . 
Then, in the first stage, taking into account this result, the domestic public firm maximizes social welfare: 
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 
   
223 6 3 4
max ,  s.t. 
6t
c t kt c t
W t c t
    
  . 
Solving this problem, we obtain 
1
, if 
3 4
, otherwise
3 4
M
I
c k
c
t
c
k


 

 
. 
Then, the quantity produced by the domestic public firm is given by 
 ,
1
1, if 
3 4
, otherwise
3 4
M
d I
k
c
q
k c
k


 

 
, 
the quantity produced by the foreign firm is given by 
 ,
1
0, if 
2 1
, otherwise
3 4
M
f I
k
c
q
kc
k


 

 
, 
and the aggregate quantity is given by 
 , ,
1
1, if 
3 2 2
, otherwise
3 4
M M M
I d I f I
k
c
Q q q
k c
k


   
 
 
. 
Thus, social welfare is given by 
 
 
2
2
1 1
, if 
2
4 6 4 1
, otherwise
2 3 4
M
I
kc
k
c
W
k c c
k
 


 
  
 
. 
 
3.2 Privatized duopoly 
 
Now, we consider the case where both domestic and foreign firms are private firms. Given the domestic firm's level 
t of cost-reduction and the output level dq , the foreign firm maximizes its own profit f , which yields 
1
2
d
f
q
q

 . 
The domestic firm chooses the output level dq  that maximizes its own profit d , which gives 
 
1 2 2
2
d
c t
q t
 
 . 
So, 
 
1 2 2
4
f
c t
q t
 
 . 
In the first stage, the domestic firm solves the following maximization problem 
 
   
221 4 4 4
max ,  s.t. 
8
d
t
c t kt c t
t c t
    
  . 
Solving the problem, we obtain 
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 
1
, if 
2
1 2
, otherwise
2 1
P
I
c k
c
t
c
k



  


. 
Then, the quantity produced by the domestic firm is given by 
 
 
,
1 1
, if 
2 2
1 2
, otherwise
2 1
P
d I
k
c
q
k c
k



  

 
, 
the quantity produced by the foreign firm is given by 
 
 
,
1 1
, if 
2 2
1 2 2
, otherwise
4 1
P
f I
k
c
q
k c
k



   

 
, 
and the aggregate quantity is given by 
 
 
, ,
3 1
, if 
4 2
3 2 2
, otherwise
4 1
P P P
I d I f I
k
c
Q q q
k c
k



     

 
. 
Thus, social welfare is given by 
   
 
2
2 2 2
2
13 16 1
, if 
32 2
20 24 13 4 4 7 4 4
, otherwise
32 1
P
I
kc
k
c
W
k c c k c c
k
 


       

 
. 
4. Case II - The foreign firm is the leader
Now, consider the case where the foreign firm is the leader. In the competition of quantity levels, the foreign firm 
chooses its output volume 
fq , and the domestic firm chooses dq after having observed the quantity level fq . 
4.1 Mixed duopoly 
Suppose that the domestic firm is a public firm. Given the domestic public firm's level t of cost-reduction and the 
output level fq , the domestic firm maximizes the social welfare W, which yields 
  1dq t c t   . 
The foreign private firm chooses the output level 
fq that maximizes its own profit f , which gives
 
2
f
c t
q t

 . 
Then, in the first stage, taking into account this result, the domestic public firm maximizes social welfare: 
 
   
224 8 4 5
max ,  s.t. 
8t
c t kt c t
W t c t
    
  . 
Solving this problem, we obtain 
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1
, if 
4 4
, otherwise
4 5
M
II
c k
c
t
c
k


 

 
 
Then, the quantity produced by the domestic public firm is given by 
 ,
1
1, if 
4 1 1
, otherwise
4 5
M
d II
k
c
q
k c
k


 
 
 
, 
the quantity produced by the foreign firm is given by 
 ,
1
0, if 
2 1
, otherwise
4 5
M
f II
k
c
q
kc
k


 

 
, 
and the aggregate quantity is given by 
 , ,
1
1, if 
4 2 3
, otherwise
4 5
M M M
II d II f II
k
c
Q q q
k c
k


   
 
 
. 
Thus, social welfare is given by 
 
 
2
2
1 1
, if 
2
5 8 4 1
, otherwise
2 4 5
M
II
kc
k
c
W
k c c
k
 


 
  
 
. 
 
4.2 Privatized duopoly 
 
Here, we consider the case where both domestic and foreign firms are private firms. Given the domestic firm's level 
t of cost-reduction and the output level 
fq , the domestic firm maximizes its own profit d , which yields 
1
2
f
d
c t q
q
  
 . 
The foreign firm chooses the output level 
fq  that maximizes its own profit f , which gives 
 
1
2
f
c t
q t
 
 . 
So, 
 
1 3 3
4
d
c t
q t
 
 . 
In the first stage, the domestic firm solves the following maximization problem 
 
   
221 6 8 9
max ,  s.t. 
16
d
t
c t kt c t
t c t
    
   
Solving the problem, we obtain 
 
3
, if 
8
3 1 3
, otherwise
8 9
P
II
c k
c
t
c
k


 

 
. 
Then, the quantity produced by the domestic firm is given by 
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 ,
1 3
, if 
4 8
2 1 3
, otherwise
8 9
P
d II
k
c
q
k c
k


 

 
, 
the quantity produced by the foreign firm is given by 
 ,
1 3
, if 
2 8
4 1 3
, otherwise
8 9
P
f II
k
c
q
k c
k


 
 
 
, 
and the aggregate quantity is given by 
 , ,
3 3
, if 
4 8
2 3 6
, otherwise
8 9
P P P
II d II f II
k
c
Q q q
k c
k


   
 
 
. 
 
Thus, social welfare is given by 
   
 
2
2 2 2
2
11 16 3
, if 
32 8
4 19 18 11 3 27 26 27 36
, otherwise
2 8 9
P
II
kc
k
c
W
k c c k c c
k
 


       

 
. 
 
5. Comparisons 
 
In this section, we are going to compare the levels of cost-reducing R&D investment and the domestic social welfare 
in the different models previously analysed. In particular, we focus our attention on the effects of privatization of a 
domestic firm in the international Stackelberg models considered. Here, for our analysis, we assume that 1/k c . 
This assumption guarantees that the foreign firm is active. 
 
Theorem 1. For any  0,1/ 3c  and 
1 4
max ,
3
k
c
 
  
 
, we have that 
   and   M P M PI I II IIt t t t  . 
 
Theorem 1 states that, in the international Stackelberg competition considered, privatization lowers productive 
efficiency of the domestic firm, regardless of whether the domestic firm is leader or follower. 
 
Theorem 2. For any  0,1/ 3c  and 
1 4
max ,
3
k
c
 
  
 
, we have that 
   and   M P M PI I II IIW W W W  . 
 
Theorem 2 states that, in the international Stackelberg competition considered, privatization of the domestic public 
firm deteriorates the domestic social welfare, regardless of whether the domestic firm is leader or follower. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We have analysed the effects of trade with a foreign firm and privatization of the domestic public firm on an 
incentive for the domestic firm to reduce costs by undertaking R&D investment, when the firms move sequentially 
(Stackelberg model). We stated that the domestic privatized firm lose its incentive to raise the level of R&D 
investment, regardless of whether the domestic firm is leader or follower. Furthermore, this privatization leads to 
deterioration of the domestic social welfare, regardless of whether the domestic firm is leader or follower. 
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We will pursue further research on similar models but on price competition. 
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